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FREEDOM TO FLOAT: REQUIRING 
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR BOATING 
STOPS ON IDAHO WATERWAYS 
Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho 
is individual liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike the 
mountains, and float the rivers of this state without interference 
from the government. That is, police treat you as a criminal only 
if your actions correspond.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just after sunset on June 5, 2009, Ty Newsom was operating his 
motorboat on the north end of Lake Coeur d’Alene.2 Upon observing Mr. 
Newsom’s boat, two deputy sheriffs mistakenly believed that he was 
speeding.3 The deputies turned on their overhead lights and stopped the 
boat.4 Because the deputies were mistaken in their belief that Mr. New-
som was speeding, the stop was suspicionless.5 
One of the deputies approached Mr. Newsom’s boat and asked for 
his identification and boat registration, which he provided.6 The depu-
ties also conducted a safety inspection, checking for personal flotation 
devices and fire extinguishers, among other things.7 During the safety 
inspection, one of the deputies noticed that Mr. Newsom displayed signs 
of intoxication.8 After Mr. Newsom failed several field sobriety tests, the 
deputy decided that he was under the influence of alcohol and arrested 
him.9 Mr. Newsom refused to submit to an evidentiary test and was lat-
er charged with boating under the influence of alcohol.10 
Mr. Newsom’s facts might prompt some forgiveness of the officers’ 
misjudgment. Despite their suspicionless stop, the deputies were able to 
identify and arrest an individual who displayed signs of intoxication, 
preventing potentially harmful future events from occurring. However, 
what if the scenario changed slightly? 
                                                       
 2. Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, 
Motion in Limine, and Motion to Dismiss at 1, State v. Newsom, No. CR-2009-11898 (Idaho 
1st Dist. 2009) [hereinafter Newsom Memorandum Opinion and Order]. 
 3. Id. at 2–3. A Kootenai County ordinance established a daytime speed limit of 
fifty miles per hour and a nighttime speed limit of twenty miles per hour. Id. However, the 
nighttime speed limit did not take effect until one hour after sunset. Id. at 3. The magistrate 
judge found that the stop occurred less than one hour after sunset and, therefore, that the 
defendant’s speed of thirty-six miles per hour did not exceed the daytime speed limit. Id. at 
2–3. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
 5. Id. at 10–11. Although the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard allows 
room for some mistakes, it requires that “the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.” 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). Here, the officers’ mistake was unrea-
sonable because they could have easily verified the time of sunset. Newsom Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, supra note 2, at 10. 
 6. Newsom Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 2, at 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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Suppose Tom takes the day off work and decides to go boating at a 
lake with his family.11 Tom and his family are having a great time 
wakeboarding and tubing. They are eating sandwiches and drinking 
bottled root beer. Suddenly, they hear a siren and see blue overhead 
lights. A patrol boat approaches and pulls alongside their boat. One of-
ficer boards their boat and asks to see Tom’s identification and boat reg-
istration, which he provides. The officer then notices several empty root 
beer bottles in cup holders throughout the boat. Believing the bottles are 
empty beer bottles, the officer asks Tom whether he and his family have 
been drinking. Before Tom can respond, the officer looks at Tom’s eyes 
and believes they look red and watery. In reality, Tom’s eyes are red and 
watery because his allergies tend to flare up this time of year. 
Before Tom can explain, the officer explains that he will transport 
Tom to the shore to perform field sobriety tests. Tom contends that he 
has not had anything to drink all day and begins to move away from the 
officer. Believing Tom is resisting, the officer pulls out his handcuffs and 
tells Tom to turn around because he is under arrest for boating while 
intoxicated. When Tom begins to protest further, the officer slams him 
onto the floor of the boat and handcuffs him face down in front of his 
family. Another officer attaches Tom’s boat to the patrol boat with a 
rope and tows it to the nearby marina while Tom remains face down. 
Onshore, the officers have Tom perform three standard field sobriety 
tests. However, Tom does not meet decision points for arrest. Further, 
the officers administer a Breathalyzer test, which reveals that Tom has 
not been drinking alcohol. The officers remove the handcuffs and release 
Tom. 
While Mr. Newsom’s facts might prompt some forgiveness of the of-
ficers’ misjudgment, the same is probably not true in Tom’s case. Mr. 
Newsom’s arrest led to a charge of boating under the influence. Howev-
er, Tom’s arrest led to a severe limitation on individual liberty and a 
fruitless evidentiary search. Idaho’s special interest in protecting indi-
vidual freedom requires more. 
Although Idaho statutory and appellate case law do not currently 
address the issue, Idaho should require law enforcement officers to have 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping boats operating 
on its waters. This would ensure the protection of Fourth Amendment 
rights, while allowing law enforcement officers to enforce boating safety 
laws effectively. Part II of this comment discusses the history of boating 
                                                       
 11. This scenario is loosely based on an actual boating stop that occurred in Ohio. 
See D’Arcy Egan, Gov. Kasich goes Lake Erie walleye fishing, signs Boater Freedom Act, 
CLEVELAND.COM (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.cleveland.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2013/07/gov_kasich_goes_lake_erie_wall.html. 
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stops in the United States, focusing on the landmark Supreme Court 
decision United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.12 Part III discusses the 
modern trend among the states of requiring some level of suspicion for 
boating stops.13 Part IV discusses Idaho’s boating enforcement statute 
and case law.14 Part V argues that Idaho should follow the lead of states 
like Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida and require law enforcement 
officers to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before stopping 
boats on its waters.15 Finally, Part VI concludes with an invitation to 
act.16 
II. HISTORY OF BOATING STOPS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . 
.”17 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.”18 
Congress first addressed the subject of boating stops in 1789, when 
it enacted what became an exception to the Fourth Amendment apply-
ing to customs officers.19 Congress later included the Coast Guard in 
this exception.20 The Supreme Court addressed the subject of boating 
stops under the customs statute in 1983 when it decided United States 
v. Villamonte-Marquez.21 Villamonte-Marquez and the Supreme Court’s 
line of automobile cases provide the backdrop for an analysis of inland 
boating stops on the state level. 
A. Customs and Coast Guard Statutes 
In 1789, the First Congress enacted the Act of July 31, 1789, which 
authorized customs officers to stop and board boats.22 Congress enacted 
the statute to provide “for the due collection of duties imposed by law on 
                                                       
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See infra Part VI. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 19. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. 
 20. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2015). 
 21. See generally United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
 22. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. 
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the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises 
imported into the United States . . . .”23 The Act authorized “every collec-
tor, naval officer and surveyor” to enter and to search “any ship or ves-
sel, in which they [had] reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchan-
dise subject to duty [were] concealed.”24 Just one year later, in 1790, 
Congress repealed the Act.25 The revised version authorized customs 
officers “to go on board of ships or vessels in any part of the United 
States . . . for the purposes of demanding the manifests aforesaid, and of 
examining and searching the said ships or vessels.”26 
It is interesting to note that the First Congress grappled with the 
question of whether customs officials were required to have “reason to 
suspect” that boats were engaged in criminal activity before making a 
stop. The 1789 and 1790 versions of the customs Act evidence this 
struggle. The Act of July 31, 1789 suggests that Congress’s original in-
tent was to require some level of suspicion.27 
The 1790 version of the Act is considered the lineal ancestor of 19 
U.S.C. § 1581(a), the present-day statute granting customs officers au-
thority to stop boats.28 Section 1581(a) authorizes customs officers to 
board a boat, inspect its manifest and other documents and papers, and 
search the entire boat.29 The Coast Guard counterpart to § 1581(a) is 14 
U.S.C. § 89(a), enacted in 1950.30 Like § 1581(a), § 89(a) authorizes the 
Coast Guard to board a boat, examine its documents and papers, and 
search the boat.31 
                                                       
 23. Id. at ch. 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 29. 
 24. Id. at ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43 (emphasis added). 
 25. Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 164. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. 
 28. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983). 
 29. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2015). The statute provides in its entirety: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle 
at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be 
authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-
Smuggling Act, or at any other authorized place without as well as within his dis-
trict, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, in-
spect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, 
package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, 
and use all necessary force to compel compliance. Id. 
 30. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2015). 
 31. Id. The statute provides in its entirety: 
The Coast Guard may make inquires, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, 
and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for 
the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such 
purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any 
vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address 
inquires of those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, 
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At first glance, § 1581(a) and § 89(a) grant customs officials and the 
Coast Guard seemingly unlimited discretion in determining which par-
ticular boat to stop. The language of each statute is extremely broad. 
Fortunately, federal courts of appeals provide direction.32 
For example, in United States v. Serrano, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that customs officers acting under § 
1581(a) were required to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
in order to stop a boat on inland waters.33 In reaching its decision, the 
court noted that “[s]earches and seizures made pursuant to [§ 1581(a)] 
must, of course, meet the general standard of reasonableness imposed 
by the Fourth Amendment.”34 The court made a clear distinction be-
tween “inland waters” and “customs waters,” concluding that reasonable 
suspicion was required on inland waters, as opposed to customs waters, 
where reasonable suspicion was not required.35 The Serrano rule took 
hold, and many federal courts followed its precedent, requiring customs 
officers and the Coast Guard to have reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity when stopping boats on inland—and sometimes even coastal—
waters.36 
B. The Narrow Holding of Villamonte-Marquez  
On the heels of these decisions, the Supreme Court took up the is-
sue of suspicionless stops on inland waters when it decided United 
States v. Villamonte-Marquez in 1983.37  In Villamonte-Marquez, cus-
toms officers patrolling a Louisiana channel located eighteen miles in-
                                                                                                                                
and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such 
inquires, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the Unit-
ed States rendering a person liable to arrest is, or has been committed, by any person, such 
person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested 
on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a 
breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or 
the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such 
vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if nec-
essary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be 
seized. Id. 
 32. United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1148–49 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1147. 
 35. Id. at 1147–1148. 
 36. United States v. Gollwitzer, 697 F.2d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
customs officers acting under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) were required to have reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity in order to stop a boat on inland waters); United States v. Streifel, 665 
F.2d 414, 422–23 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that Coast Guard officers acting under 14 U.S.C. § 
89(a) were required to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to stop a boat 
on coastal waters); United States v. D’Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that customs officers acting under 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) were required to have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity in order to stop a boat on inland waters). 
 37. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1983). 
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land from the Gulf of Mexico approached a sailboat after a freighter cre-
ated a large wake in the channel.38 The officers spotted one man on 
deck, who shrugged his shoulders and failed to respond when the offic-
ers asked him whether the sailboat and crew were all right.39 The offic-
ers then boarded the sailboat to inspect the boat’s documentation.40 Af-
ter boarding the sailboat, one of the officers thought he smelled burning 
marijuana and saw marijuana bales through an open hatch.41 The offic-
ers subsequently found marijuana “in almost every conceivable place” 
onboard.42 The officers arrested the crew, which consisted of two men.43 
The Court found that the officers’ stop and subsequent boarding of 
the defendants’ sailboat was not accompanied by reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.44 However, the Court concluded that the officers were 
not required to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because 
the suspicionless stop and subsequent boarding was authorized by 19 
U.S.C. § 1581(a).45 The Court reviewed the statute’s history and noted 
that it had “an impressive historical pedigree” because the statute’s 
“lineal ancestor,” the Act August 4, 1790, authorized suspicionless 
stops.46 Notably, the Court did not mention the original version of the 
Act, the Act of July 31, 1789, which required customs officers to have 
“reason to suspect” criminal activity before making a stop.47 As stated in 
Part II.A, the Act of July 31, 1789 is important because it evidences 
original Congressional intent.48 
The Court next balanced the governmental interests of public safe-
ty and crime prevention against the level of intrusion on individual lib-
erty.49 In doing so, the Court highlighted differences between automo-
biles and boats.50 First, the Court made a clear distinction between boat-
ing stops that occur on inland waters with “ready access to the open sea” 
and stops that occur on inland waters without such access.51 The Court 
noted that waters with ready access to the open sea lack narrow 
                                                       
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 583. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 583. 
 44. Id. at 583–84. 
 45. Id. at 592–93. 
 46. Id. at 584–85; see also supra note 25. 
 47. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 588–93.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 589. 
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straights, where roadblock or checkpoint stops are viable alternatives.52 
It stated that inland waters without ready access “may funnel into riv-
ers, canals, and the like, which are more analogous to roads and made a 
‘roadblock’ approach more feasible.”53 The Court also distinguished wa-
ters with ready access to the open sea because the threats of smuggling 
and the illegal importation of aliens are primary concerns on those wa-
ters, which is not the case on inland waters lacking ready access.54 
Second, the Court contrasted documentation requirements for boats 
with the automobile licensing system.55 The Court stated that, while law 
enforcement officers can readily determine whether an automobile is in 
compliance with the law by observing a vehicle’s license plate and stick-
ers, the same is not true for boats, since comparable license plate and 
sticker requirements do not currently exist.56  
Finally, the Court found that the intrusion on individual liberty 
was limited because the stop involved only a brief detention.57 The Court 
stated that the intrusion on individual liberty did not outweigh govern-
mental interests because “the need to make document checks [in waters 
with ready access to the open sea] is great.”58 While it is true that the 
Court spent a substantial portion of its opinion highlighting differences 
between automobiles and vessels, it is important to note that the Court 
repeatedly limited its holding to vessels operating in waters with ready 
access to the open sea.59 This narrowing language suggests that the 
Court only considered differences between automobiles and vessels sig-
nificant in waters with ready access to the open sea.60 
The dissent argued that the majority’s reliance on perceived differ-
ences between automobiles and boats was flawed.61 It argued that the 
Court was ignoring binding precedent from a long line of Supreme Court 
cases involving automobiles that prohibited roving, suspicionless stops.62 
The dissent also emphasized that every automobile case required a “dis-
cretion-limiting feature,” such as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, 
or the use of fixed checkpoints.63 It expressed fear that the majority’s 
                                                       
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 589–90. 
 56. Id. at 590. 
 57. Id. at 592. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 593. The majority used the narrowing term “ready access to the open sea” 
four separate times in its opinion. Id. at 581, 588–89, 593. 
 60. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 593. 
 61. Id. at 593, 600–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Stevens, in 
part, joined Justice Brennan in dissent. Id. at 593. 
 62. Id. at 601–05; see, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). 
 63. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 599 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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decision granted “unlimited police discretion”64 because it failed to place 
“any limitations whatever on officers’ discretion.”65 
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s reliance on the dif-
ferences between vessel documentation requirements and the automo-
bile licensing system.66 It stated that it would be easy and inexpensive 
to create a boating licensing system similar to the automobile licensing 
system, and that the absence of such a system did not excuse random 
boating stops.67 
C. The Supreme Court’s Line of Automobile Cases 
As the dissent underlined, the majority in Villamonte-Marquez 
spent a considerable amount of time reviewing its long line of automo-
bile cases.68  The Court distinguished Villamonte-Marquez from those 
cases, highlighting differences between automobiles and boats in waters 
with ready access to the open sea.69 However, the Supreme Court’s line 
of automobile cases is much more applicable in the context of inland wa-
ters lacking ready access to the open sea. 
The standard for automobile stops has its roots in Terry v. Ohio.70 
In Terry, a Cleveland police detective developed a suspicion that two 
men were about to commit a robbery when he observed the men making 
a dozen trips from one position to a store window.71 The officer ap-
proached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for 
their names.72 When one of the men mumbled in response to his in-
quires, the officer patted down the men and found weapons.73 The men 
were convicted of carrying concealed weapons and appealed.74 
The Supreme Court held that the officer’s investigatory search was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, both because the officer was 
checking for weapons to protect his own safety and because the officer 
limited the scope of his search.75 The Court in Terry announced a new 
                                                       
 64. Id. at 598, n. 6. 
 65. Id. at 598. 
 66. Id. at 609. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 587–93. 
 69. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 587–93. 
 70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968). 
 71. Id. at 5–6. 
 72. Id. at 6–7. 
 73. Id. at 7–8. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 30. 
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standard for evaluating investigatory stops: a law enforcement officer 
must have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.”76 
Seven years after Terry, the Supreme Court applied Terry in the 
context of an automobile stop near the border in United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce.77 In Brignoni-Ponce, two Border Patrol officers stopped 
an automobile on a stretch of highway adjacent to a closed checkpoint 
near the United States-Mexico border.78 The officers later stated that 
their only reason for stopping the automobile was that the three occu-
pants appeared to be of Mexican descent.79 The Court found that the 
stop was a roving stop because the stop did not occur at a permanent or 
temporary checkpoint.80 The Court also found that the officers’ belief 
that the occupants were of Mexican descent did not provide them with 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.81 The Court weighed the level 
of intrusion on individual liberty with the governmental interests of the 
stop.82 Despite its finding that the level of intrusion on individual liberty 
was modest, and that the governmental interest in protecting its bor-
ders was substantial, the Court invalidated the stop because “the rea-
sonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment [demanded] some-
thing more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by the Gov-
ernment.”83 The Court emphasized that roads near the border carry a 
large volume of legitimate traffic, not just aliens seeking to enter the 
country illegally.84 
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce assured law enforcement officials that 
they would still have power to ensure safety at the border under a rea-
sonable suspicion standard.85 The Court expressly authorized law en-
forcement officers to consider information such as proximity to the bor-
der, recent border crossings in the area, the driver’s behavior, and as-
pects of the vehicle itself when determining whether there is reasonable 
suspicion to make an automobile stop in a border area.86 
One year later, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte presented the Su-
preme Court with a slightly different set of facts.87 In Martinez-Fuerte, 
Border Patrol officers briefly stopped all automobiles passing through 
permanent checkpoints near the United States-Mexico border.88 The of-
                                                       
 76. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 77. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). 
 78. Id. at 874–75. 
 79. Id. at 875. 
 80. Id. at 876. 
 81. Id. at 876, 886. 
 82. Id. at 878–79. 
 83. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 884–85. 
 86. Id. 
 87. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976). 
 88. Id. 
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ficers did not have any suspicion of criminal activity.89 The Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the stops, holding that governmental interests 
outweigh individual liberty and security where stops are conducted at 
permanent checkpoints. 90  The court reasoned that checkpoint stops 
place sufficient limitations on the discretion of law enforcement offi-
cials.91 
As illustrated by Brignoni-Ponce, roving automobile stops near the 
border are unconstitutional.92 The Supreme Court applied these princi-
ples to an inland roving stop in Delaware v. Prouse.93 In Prouse, a pa-
trolman in a police cruiser stopped an automobile in Delaware.94 As he 
approached the automobile, the patrolman smelled marijuana smoke, 
and later seized a marijuana plant in plain view on the car floor.95 The 
patrolman testified that “prior to stopping the vehicle he had [not] ob-
served . . . traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity, 
and that he made the stop only in order to check the driver’s license and 
registration.”96 
The Supreme Court invalidated the stop, finding that the patrol-
man’s discretion was “standardless and unconstrained.” 97  The Court 
stated that, in order to make a roving automobile stop, an officer must 
have “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is 
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the 
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of 
law.”98 
Reading these cases together, it is clear that roving, suspicionless 
automobile stops are unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court favors checkpoint stops because they place sufficient limits on 
officer discretion. These same principles should apply in the boating 
context. In fact, several of the most recent state court decisions distin-
guish Villamonte-Marquez, highlighting parallels between automobiles 
and boats on inland waters lacking ready access to the open sea.99 
 
                                                       
 89. Id. at 547. 
 90. Id. at 566–67. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884. 
 93. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 94. Id. at 650. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 663. 
 99. See infra Part III. 
558 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
   
 
III. THE MODERN TREND: STATES ARE REQUIRING SOME 
LEVEL OF SUSPICION 
The modern trend among many states is to require law enforce-
ment officers to have some level of suspicion before making a boating 
stop.100 Authority to enforce state boating law is typically conferred to 
law enforcement officers in a state’s boating enforcement provision.101 
Although statutory language—and the cases and regulations interpret-
ing it—differs widely, states fall into three categories in their approach-
es to boating stops. First, some states do not address whether some level 
of suspicion is required.102 Second, some states grant law enforcement 
officers authority to make stops without any suspicion of criminal activi-
ty.103 Third, some states require law enforcement officers to have some 
level of suspicion.104 
A. States that Do Not Address Whether Some Level of Suspicion is 
Required 
Some states have not addressed whether law enforcement officers 
must have some level of suspicion before making a boating stop.105 These 
states include (1) states with very general enforcement provisions,106 
and (2) states with more specific enforcement provisions that grant au-
thority to stop and—in some cases—board boats, but do not address 
whether some level of suspicion is required.107 States in the first group 
                                                       
100. See infra Part III.C. 
101. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-7028 (2015). 
102. See infra Part III.A. 
103. See infra Part III.B. 
104. See infra Part III.C. 
105. See infra notes 106 & 107. Although these states do not address whether some 
level of suspicion is required to stop boats, some expressly require reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to board boats. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.080(b) (2015) (requiring proba-
ble cause to board boats). 
106. These seven states are: Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Vermont. ALA. CODE §33-5-6 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2215(b) 
(2015); IND. CODE § 14-15-10-1 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-506(2) (2015); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 63, § 4202 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-21-80 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3318(c) 
(2015). 
107. These seventeen states are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.080(b) (2015) 
(authorizing peace officers to stop and, with probable cause, board watercraft); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 5-391(c) (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop” watercraft); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 33-13-112(1) (2015) (authorizing to peace officers to “stop and board” vessels); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 15-154(b) (2015) (authorizing officers to “stop and board” vessels); IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-7028 (2015) (authorizing sheriffs to “stop and board” vessels); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-
1179 (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop and board” vessels); NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-
1269 (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop and board” vessels); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
488.900(1) (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop and board” vessels); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
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have general enforcement provisions that vaguely grant law enforce-
ment officers authority to enforce state boating laws.108 For example, the 
Indiana enforcement statute generally authorizes Indiana law enforce-
ment officers to enforce the “article” and “rules adopted by the depart-
ment under [the] article.”109 Since there are no cases, administrative 
regulations, or attorney general opinions interpreting this broad statu-
tory language in these states, it remains unclear whether these states 
require law enforcement officers to have some level of suspicion before 
making a stop. 
States in the second group contain greater specificity in their statu-
tory language, but still fail to address whether law enforcement officials 
must have some level of suspicion before stopping boats.110 These stat-
utes authorize law enforcement officers to “stop and board,” or a slight 
variation of this language.111 The Idaho Safe Boating Act is an exam-
ple.112 The enforcement provision of the Act authorizes sheriffs and dep-
uty sheriffs to “stop and board any vessel subject to law.”113 This “stop 
and board” language, without more, does not authorize a suspicionless 
stop. In fact, many states have interpreted almost identical statutory 
language to require some level of suspicion.114 
B. States that Authorize Suspicionless Stops 
Seven states authorize suspicionless boating stops.115 In most of 
these states, appellate courts have interpreted broad enforcement provi-
                                                                                                                                
12:6-6(a) (West 2015) (authorizing harbor masters to “stop” vessels); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-
12-22 (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop and board” vessels); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-
13-14 (2015) (authorizing to officers “stop and board” vessels); 46 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-17 
(2015) (authorizing officers to “stop and board” vessels); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-8-66 (2015) 
(authorizing officers to “stop and board” boats); TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-9-220(a) (2015) (au-
thorizing officers to “stop and board” vessels); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-18-20(2) (West 2015) 
(authorizing officers to “stop and board” vessels); WASH. REV. CODE § 79A.60.100(1) (2015) 
(authorizing officers to stop, board, and direct vessels to a suitable pier); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
41-13-215(b)(i) (2015) (authorizing peace officers to “stop, halt, inspect or board” watercraft). 
108. Supra note 106. 
109. IND. CODE § 14-15-10-1 (2015). 
110. Supra note 107. 
111. Id. 
112. IDAHO CODE § 67-7028 (2015). 
113. Id. 
114. See infra Part III.C.1. 
115. These seven states are: Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and Texas. GA. CODE ANN. § 52-7-25(a) (2015) (interpreted to authorize a 
suspicionless stop in Peruzzi v. State, 567 S.E.2d 15, 16 (Ga. 2002)); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
45/2-2(a) (2015) (interpreted to authorize a suspicionless stop in People v. Butorac, 3 N.E.3d 
438, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)); LA. STAT. ANN. § 34:851.29 (2015) (interpreted to authorize a 
suspicionless stop in State v. Eppinette, 838 So. 2d 189, 192 (La. Ct. App. 2003)); MISS. CODE 
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sions to authorize suspicionless stops, even though these provisions do 
not expressly authorize suspicionless stops.116 Most of these courts fol-
low the limited holding in Villamonte-Marquez and distinguish 
Prouse.117 Texas and Illinois are representative of this approach. 
1. Texas 
Texas illustrates a relatively recent example. The Texas boating 
enforcement provision provides, “In order to enforce the provisions of 
[the] chapter, an enforcement officer may stop and board any vessel sub-
ject to [the] chapter and may inspect the boat to determine compliance 
with applicable provisions.”118 In 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals upheld a suspicionless stop under this provision in Schenekl v. 
State.119 In Schenekl, a game warden observed a man leaving a marina 
on a Texas lake and decided to stop the man’s boat to conduct a safety 
inspection.120 After conducting the inspection, the warden noticed that 
the man had trouble answering questions, fumbled with his fingers, and 
smelled of alcohol.121 The warden arrested the man for boating while 
intoxicated.122 
Balancing the state’s interest in recreational water safety with in-
dividual liberty, the court first expressed concern over the “unsettling 
and inconvenient” showing of authority that accompanies a random 
stop.123 However, the court found that the balance favored the state 
since, in its view, the state’s interest could “be realistically promoted 
only through . . . random water safety checks.” 124  The court distin-
guished Prouse, finding that boats and automobiles are different be-
cause, since automobiles are a “necessary means of transportation,” 
there is a heightened expectation of privacy in an automobile.125 Citing 
Villamonte-Marquez, the court found that checkpoint stops were not a 
                                                                                                                                
ANN. § 59-21-127 (2015) (authorizing officers to board and examine vessels without a war-
rant); MO. REV. STAT. § 306.165 (2015) (interpreted by the Missouri Attorney General to 
permit suspicionless stops in Mo. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 141-85 (Dec. 27, 1985)); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 75A-17(a) (2015) (interpreted to authorize a suspicionless stop in State v. Pike, 532 S.E.2d 
543, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 31.124(a) (West 2015) (in-
terpreted to authorize a suspicionless stop in Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2000)). 
116. See, e.g., Peruzzi v. State, 567 S.E.2d 15, 16 (Ga. 2002) (interpreting the Georgia 
enforcement provision to authorize a suspicionless stop, although the provision only general-
ly authorized officers to “stop and board any vessel”). 
117. See, e.g., Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
118. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 31.124 (West 2015). 
119. Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
120. Id. at 413. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 415–16. 
124. Id. 
125. Schenekl, 30 S.W.3d at 415–16. 
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practical alternative to random stops because they would be easy to 
avoid.126 Accordingly, the court held that the stop was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment and upheld the constitutionality of the enforce-
ment provision.127 
2. Illinois 
Illinois took a similar approach. The Illinois enforcement provision 
provides, “Agents of the Department or other duly authorized police of-
ficers may board and inspect any boat at any time for the purpose of de-
termining if this Act if being complied with.”128  In 2013, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois upheld a suspicionless stop under this provision in Peo-
ple v. Butorac.129 In Butorac, two conservation police officers were pa-
trolling a 200-yard wide stretch of river when they decided to stop every 
boat they saw to check for registration and safety equipment.130 When 
the officers stopped the defendant’s boat, they checked for safety equip-
ment and noticed empty alcoholic beverage bottles in the boat.131 The 
officers also noticed that the defendant showed signs of intoxication and 
arrested him.132 
The court concluded that the stop was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.133 Weighing state and individual interests, the court em-
phasized that the brief and non-intrusive nature of the stop weighed in 
the state’s favor.134  Citing Villamonte-Marquez, the court found that 
checkpoint stops were an impractical alternative to roving stops because 
the river in Butorac did not involve “a roadway-like waterway that [was] 
amenable to fixed checkpoints or roadblocks.”135 Further, the court found 
that the safety inspection stops at issue were “part of a regular and sys-
tematic boat safety enforcement operation.”136 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the officers were not acting with unbridled discretion.137 Af-
ter Butorac, law enforcement officers in Illinois continue to make suspi-
cionless stops, despite significant backlash from Illinoisans.138 
                                                       
126. Id. at 415. 
127. Id. at 415–16. 
128. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2-2 (West 2015). 
129. People v. Butorac, 3 N.E.3d 438, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
130. Id. at 442. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 455. 
134. Id. 
135. Butorac, 3 N.E.3d at 450. 
136. Id. at 455. 
137. Id. 
138. Robert McCoppin, Backers of new watercraft laws aim to change boating cul-
ture, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 23, 2015, 7:32 AM), 
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The courts in Schenekl and Butorac both suffer from the same flaw: 
an overbroad reading of Villamonte-Marquez.139 The Court in Villamon-
te-Marquez limited its holding to waters with ready access to the open 
sea.140 However, the stop in Schenekl occurred on a lake in the middle of 
Texas,141 while the stop in Butorac occurred on a 200-yard wide river in 
Illinois.142 Those bodies of water are substantially different from a chan-
nel located eighteen miles from the Gulf of Mexico. A number of other 
states have recognized this distinction. 
C. States that Require Some Level of Suspicion 
Nineteen states require law enforcement officials to have some lev-
el of suspicion before stopping boats.143 These states fall into two catego-
ries: (1) states with relatively broad enforcement provisions that do not 
expressly require some level of suspicion,144 and (2) states with explicit 
statutory language requiring some level of suspicion.145 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county-news-sun/news/ct-illinois-watercraft-
laws-20150521-story.html. Illinois boaters report that law enforcement officers performing 
safety inspections often harass them, sometimes after they have already passed previous 
inspections. Id. Some have unsuccessfully pushed for the enactment of a Boater’s Bill of 
Rights, which “would forbid police from boarding a boat to search it unless there is reasona-
ble suspicion of wrongdoing.” Id. 
139. Schenekl, 30 S.W.3d at 415; Butorac, 3 N.E.3d at 450. 
140. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983). 
141. Schenekl, 30 S.W.3d at 413. 
142. Butorac, 3 N.E.3d at 442. 
143. See infra nn. 144 & 145. 
144. These six states are: Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire and Oregon. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105(a)(2) (2015) (interpreted to require reasona-
ble suspicion by State v. Allen, 425 S.W.3d 753 (Ark. 2013)); IOWA CODE § 462A.20 (2015) 
(interpreted to require either reasonable suspicion or a particularized checkpoint procedure 
by Iowa Att’y. Gen. Op. WL 42718 (Jan. 27, 1982)); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-727(b) 
(West 2015) (interpreted to require reasonable suspicion by Blair v. U.S., 665 F.2d 500 
(1981)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B, § 12 (2015) (interpreted to require reasonable suspicion by 
Memorandum of Decision and Order on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence at 1, 
Commonwealth v. Brunet, (Mass. Super. Ct. May 25, 2005) (No. 04-0542), 2005 WL 
6066655); OR. REV. STAT. § 830.035(1) (2015) (interpreted to require reasonable suspicion by 
State v. Lecarros, 66 P.3d 543 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)). 
145. These thirteen states are: California, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 663 (West 2015); 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2016-134 (West); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 199-7(a) (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 235.310(1) (West 2015); ME. STAT. 
tit. 38, § 285 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.80166(2) (2015); MINN. STAT. § 86B.801(a) 
(2015); N.Y. NAV. LAW § 49(4) (McKinney 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.521(B) (West 
2015); 30 PA. CONS. STAT. § 901(a)(5) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-745(B) (2015); W. VA. 
CODE § 20-7-4(b)(3) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 30.79(3) (2015). 
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1. States that Interpret Relatively Broad Statutes to Require Some 
Level of Suspicion 
Some states with relatively broad enforcement provisions require 
law enforcement officers to have some level of suspicion before stopping 
boats.146 Generally, these states read “stop and board” language in light 
of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement, which requires 
warrantless searches and seizures to be reasonable in order to pass con-
stitutional muster.147 Oregon, Arkansas, and New Hampshire illustrate 
this group of states. 
a. Oregon 
The Oregon boating enforcement provision states, “[A] peace officer 
may stop any boat and direct it to a suitable pier or anchorage for board-
ing.”148 In 2003, the Oregon Court of Appeals invalidated a suspicionless 
stop under this provision.149 In State v. Lecarros, three deputy sheriffs 
were patrolling a channel in Oregon when they decided to stop a cabin 
cruiser for the purpose of conducting a random safety inspection.150 
When the defendant could not find his registration onboard, the officers 
ordered him to move his boat to a dock in order to retrieve the docu-
ments.151 As the defendant operated his boat, the officers began to sus-
pect that he was under the influence of alcohol.152 After the defendant 
failed sobriety tests, the officers arrested him.153 
The court found that the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.154 The court first distinguished Lecarros from Villamonte-
Marquez, finding the Supreme Court’s holding was limited to customs 
officials when stopping boats with ready access to the open sea.155 Se-
cond, the court noted that the enforcement provision authorized the 
State Marine Board to promulgate regulations. 156  “However, neither 
                                                       
146. See supra note 144. 
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
148. OR REV. STAT. § 830.035(1) (2015). The statute provides, in its entirety: 
(1) The sheriff of each county and all other peace officers shall be responsible for the 
enforcement of this chapter and any regulations made by the State Marine Board pursuant 
thereto. In the exercise of this responsibility, a peace officer may stop any boat and direct it 
to a suitable pier or anchorage for boarding. Id. 
149. State v. Lecarros, 66 P.3d 543, 543 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 





155. Lecarros, 66 P.3d at 547. 
156. Id. 
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that agency nor any other governmental entity [had] created rules to 
limit the discretion of . . . officers in carrying out boat searches and sei-
zures, nor could the officers articulate any such rules.”157 The court con-
cluded that the decision whether to stop the defendant’s boat was “en-
tirely within [the officers’] discretion.”158 
b. Arkansas 
Similarly, the Arkansas boating enforcement provision authorizes 
Game and Fish officers to “stop and board any vessel subject to [the] 
chapter and to investigate any accident or violation involving vessels 
subject to [the] chapter.”159  The provision does not expressly require law 
enforcement officers to have either probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity to conduct a boating stop.160 However, in 2013, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated a suspicionless boating stop 
under the provision.161 In State v. Allen, an Arkansas Game and Fish 
officer stopped a pontoon boat being operated in an “unremarkable fash-
ion” for the purpose of conducting a safety inspection.162 After boarding 
the boat, the officer concluded that the defendant was under the influ-
ence of alcohol and arrested him.163 The officer later testified that his 
intention was to stop and perform a safety check on as many vessels as 
he could in that day.164 The officer also testified that he had no plan to 
determine which boats he stopped.165 
The court held that the stop was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.166 In reaching its decision, the court balanced the state’s 
interest in public safety with individual liberty.167 While acknowledging 
that the stop at issue was brief and did not entail a high level of intru-
sion, the court expressed concern that there were no limits on officer 
discretion.168 The court stated, “Regardless of how brief or slight the in-
                                                       
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105(a)(1)–(3) (2015). The statute provides, in its en-
tirety: 
(a)(1)(A) It shall be the duty of every sheriff, deputy sheriff, state police officer, and en-
forcement officer of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission to enforce the provisions 
of this chapter . . . 
(2) In the exercise of their duty to enforce the provisions of this chapter, they shall 
have the authority to stop and board any vessel subject to this chapter and to investigate any 
accident or violation involving vessels subject to this chapter. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. State v. Allen, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ark. 2013). 
162. Id. at 755, 757. 
163. Id. at 755. 
164. Id. at 757. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Allen, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
168. Id. 
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trusion, or how weighty the public interest, an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the 
unfettered discretion of officers in the field.’”169 The court emphasized 
that, since the officer’s actions were not confined by a plan, he exercised 
unfettered discretion when he decided to stop the defendant’s pontoon 
boat.170 
The principle coming out of Lecarros and Allen suggests that a stop 
will pass constitutional muster if there is a discretion-limiting mecha-
nism, such as a checkpoint procedure or administrative regulation. The 
courts in Lecarros and Allen each expressed concern with the potential 
dangers associated with unfettered officer discretion on inland bodies of 
water. Other courts have expressed similar concerns when interpreting 
even more general statutes. 
c. New Hampshire 
New Hampshire’s boating enforcement provision is extremely 
broad.171 At first glance, it does not give any indication as to whether 
officers may conduct suspicionless stops.172 Like the enforcement provi-
sions in seven other states, the provision generally authorizes the com-
missioner of safety to “enforce the provisions of [the] chapter and the 
rules adopted under [the] section.”173 In 2004, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court invalidated a suspicionless stop under the provision in 
State v. McKeown.174 In McKeown, a New Hampshire Marine Patrol Of-
ficer stopped the defendant’s kayak while conducting random personal 
flotation device checks on a lake.175 When the defendant did not produce 
his personal flotation device upon request, the officer issued him a 
summons and escorted him back to a dock.176 The court held that the 
stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the officer 
did not have an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.177 Therefore, 
despite a vague grant of authority, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
concluded that the statute should be read in light of the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. 
                                                       
169. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). 
170. Id. 
171. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 270:11(II) (2015). 
172. Id. 
173. Id.; see supra note 106. 
174. See State v. McKeown, 849 A.2d 127 (N.H. 2004). 
175. Id. at 129. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 130. 
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2. States with Statutory Language Requiring Some Level of Suspicion 
An increasing number of states have boating enforcement provi-
sions that explicitly require law enforcement officers to have either rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to make a boat-
ing stop.178 Illustrating the modern trend, Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and 
Florida have recently amended their enforcement provisions to require 
reasonable suspicion. 
a. Ohio: The Model Statute 
Ohio provides the ideal statutory scheme. However, Ohio’s sweep-
ing legislative response came only after a court decision invalidated a 
suspicionless boating stop.179 State v. Carr triggered a complete rework-
ing of the Ohio boating enforcement provision.180 
In 2007, the Ohio Court of Appeals decided State v. Carr.181 At the 
time, the Ohio boating enforcement provision authorized state water-
craft officers to “stop, board, and conduct a safety inspection of any ves-
sel.”182 In Carr, an Ohio Department of Natural Resources park officer 
was patrolling an inland lake when he decided to stop a pontoon boat to 
conduct a safety inspection, despite the fact that he did not observe any 
law violation.183 After conducting the safety inspection, the officer ob-
served alcoholic beverages on the floor of the boat and noted that the 
defendant appeared intoxicated.184 The officer arrested the defendant.185 
The court held that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.186 In 
reaching its decision, the court distinguished Carr from Villamonte-
Marquez, finding that the lake did not have ready access to the open 
sea.187 Therefore, a checkpoint stop was a practical alternative.188 Addi-
tionally, the court stated that Ohio law did “not define or describe the 
scope of a ‘safety inspection’ and there [were] no limitations on the dis-
cretion of state officers in conducting [such safety] inspections.”189 The 
court was particularly concerned that officers had complete discretion 
                                                       
178. See supra note 145. 
179. See generally State v. Carr, 878 N.E.2d 1077, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
180. Id. 
181. Carr, 878 N.E.2d at 1082. 
182. 1998 Ohio Laws, File 200, at § 1547.521. The statute provided, in its entirety, 
“For the purpose of enforcing the laws and rules that they have the authority to en-
force, [state watercraft officers] may stop, board, and conduct a safety inspection of any ves-
sel.” Id. 
183. Carr, 878 N.E.2d at 1079, 1081. 
184. Id. at 1079. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1082. 
187. Id. at 1081. 
188. Id. 
189. Carr, 878 N.E.2d at 1077, 1081 (internal quotations added). 
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over whether to stop a particular boat.190 Based on this reasoning, the 
court concluded that officers were only permitted to stop boats in two 
circumstances: (1) “with articulable[,] reasonable suspicion of a water-
craft violation or other violation of law which they [were] authorized to 
enforce” or (2) if there was “a particularized checkpoint procedure de-
signed and systematically administered to limit the discretion of offic-
ers.”191 
After Carr, Ohio law enforcement officers continued to conduct 
suspicionless stops.192 There was “one instance of a local boater being 
brought to shore while face down and in handcuffs, even though a 
breathalyzer test showed no evidence of alcohol use.”193 Boaters com-
plained about “constant safety inspections by local and state agen-
cies.”194 Some boaters even complained they had been stopped “multiple 
times during the same day.”195 
In response to these pervasive concerns, the Ohio legislature took 
action in 2013.196 On July 10, 2013, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed 
House Bill 29, the “Boater Freedom Act.”197 The Act codified the Carr 
holding, amending Ohio’s boating enforcement provision to authorize a 
state watercraft officer to stop, board, and conduct a safety inspection 
only (1) with a reasonable suspicion of a law violation or (2) at an au-
thorized checkpoint. 198  The Ohio Legislature passed the Act “as an 
                                                       
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1082. 
192. Egan, supra note 11. 
193. Egan, supra note 11. 
194. Egan, supra note 11. 
195. Egan, supra note 11. 
196. Governor John Kasich Signs Boater Freedom Act, OHIO DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Ju-
ly 10, 2013), http://www.ohiodnr.gov/news/post/governor-john-kasich-signs-boater-freedom-
act. 
197. Id. 
198. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.521(B) (West 2015). The amended statute pro-
vides, in its entirety: 
(B)(1) Except as authorized by division (B)(2) of this section, no state watercraft officer 
or other law enforcement officer as described in section 1547.63 of the Revised Code shall stop 
or board any vessel solely for the purpose of conducting a safety inspection of the vessel un-
less the owner or operator voluntarily requests the watercraft officer or other law enforce-
ment officer to conduct a safety inspection of the vessel. 
(2) A state watercraft officer or other law enforcement officer as described in section 
1547.63 of the Revised Code may stop, board, and conduct a safety inspection of any vessel for 
the purpose of enforcing the laws and rules that the officer has the authority to enforce under 
this chapter, if either of the following applies: 
(a) The watercraft officer or law enforcement officer authorized under section 1547.63 
of the Revised Code has a reasonable suspicion that the vessel, the vessel’s equipment, or the 
vessel’s operator is in violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it or is otherwise en-
gaged in a violation of a law of this state or a local ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation 
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emergency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the 
public peace, health, and safety.”199 This is not surprising, considering 
the widespread problems at the time. These problems were not confined 
solely to Ohio, as illustrated by the Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida leg-
islatures over the next three years. 
b. Kentucky, Virginia, & Florida: The Model Timeline 
Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida represent the ideal timeline model. 
Each state enacted a similar statute to Ohio, but on a much shorter 
timeline. 
In 2014, the Kentucky legislature followed Ohio’s lead, enacting its 
own “Boater Freedom Act.” 200  Prior to 2014, Kentucky’s boating en-
forcement provision was very broad.201 The provision authorized law en-
forcement officers “to enter upon all boats [on Kentucky waters] for the 
purpose of examining their registration documents and inspect their 
marine sanitation device . . . .”202 The amended version authorizes a law 
enforcement officer to stop a boat only “if the officer has a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, demon-
strate that a violation of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or an adminis-
trative regulation promulgated under this chapter has occurred.”203 
                                                                                                                                
adopted in compliance with the provisions of this chapter within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the officer; 
(b) The watercraft officer or law enforcement officer authorized under section 1547.63 
of the Revised Code is conducting a vessel safety inspection in the course of an authorized 
checkpoint operation in accordance with rules adopted by the chief of the division of water-
craft under section 1547.52 of the Revised Code. Id. 
199. 2013 Ohio Laws, File 26, at § 3. 
200. 2014 Ky. Acts, ch. 109. 
201. 2007 Ky. Acts, ch. 85. 
202. Id. 
203. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 235.310(1) (West 2015). The amended statute provides, 
in its entirety: 
The commissioner of the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources shall designate of-
ficers and employees of the department to enforce the provisions of this chapter, and these 
officers when duly authorized by the commissioner shall have the general powers of a peace 
officer for the enforcement of other offenses against the Commonwealth. In enforcing the 
provisions of this chapter, these officers and all other peace officers of the Commonwealth 
and its subdivisions shall have the right to enter upon all waters of this state, either private 
or public, for the purpose of inspecting certificate of registration and boat numbering, but 
shall only have the right to stop or enter upon boats on such waters if the officer has a rea-
sonable and articulable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, demonstrate that a violation of the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes or an administrative regulation promulgated under this chapter has 
occurred, with any subsequent search of the boat or persons on it being authorized only if 
supported by probable cause. The provisions of this section shall not apply to license inspec-
tions under KRS 150.090(5), but only as to those licenses and items specified in that section. 
They may arrest on sight, without warrant, any person detected by them in the act of violat-
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In 2015, Virginia amended its boating enforcement provision to re-
quire reasonable suspicion.204 Prior to 2015, the provision authorized a 
law enforcement officer to “stop, board and inspect any vessel . . . after 
having identified himself in his official capacity.”205 The amended ver-
sion states that a law enforcement officer cannot “stop, board, or inspect 
any noncommercial vessel . . . unless such officer has reasonable suspi-
cion that a violation of law or regulation exists.”206 
Finally, on March 25, 2016, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed a 
bill that amended Florida’s boating enforcement provision to require 
reasonable suspicion. 207  Prior to 2016, Florida’s boating enforcement 
provision broadly authorized law enforcement officers to “cause any in-
spections to be made of all vessels.”208 In fact, one year before the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Villamonte-Marquez—in 1982—the Florida Su-
preme Court upheld a suspicionless boating stop that occurred on the 
Atlantic side of the Florida Keys in State v. Casal.209 
                                                                                                                                
ing any of the provisions of this chapter. They shall have the same rights as sheriffs to re-
quire aid in arresting, with or without process, any person found by them violating any of the 
provisions of this chapter or other offenses against the Commonwealth. Id. 
204. VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-745(B) (2015). 
205. 2007 Va. Legis. Serv., ch. 87 (West). 
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-745(B) (2015). The amended statute provides, in its en-
tirety: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A, no conservation police officer, officer of 
the Virginia Marine Police, or other law enforcement officer shall, without the consent of the 
owner, stop, board, or inspect any noncommercial vessel subject to this chapter unless such 
officer has reasonable suspicion that a violation of law or regulation exists, except that con-
servation police officers and officers of the Virginia Marine Police may conduct lawful stops 
or boardings to inspect hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses pursuant to §§ 28.2-231 and 
29.1-337 or to inspect creel and bag limits pursuant to § 29.1-209 and may conduct lawful 
boating safety checkpoints in accordance with established agency policy. Id. 
207. Conrad Defiebre, New boating decal ends repeated safety checks, TREASURE 
COAST PALM (April 13, 2016), http://www.tcpalm.com/news/indian-river-
lagoon/recreation/new-boating-decal-ends-repeated-safety-checks-2f321b01-f30e-2d96-e053-
0100007f5fa5-375555461.html. 
208. 2009 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2009-86 (West). 
209. State v. Casal, 410 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982), cert. dismissed 462 U.S. 637 
(1983). In Casal, two Florida Marine Patrol officers were patrolling the Atlantic side of the 
Florida Keys at night when they stopped a fishing vessel to inspect the registration certifi-
cate. Id. at 153. The officers initially had no suspicion of illegal activity. Id. When the de-
fendants failed to produce the vessel’s registration certificate, the officers asked for permis-
sion to board, which the defendants gave. Id. The officers discovered several marijuana bales 
onboard and arrested the defendants. Id. The court held that the initial stop was lawful be-
cause the officers were not required to have any level of suspicion to make the stop. Id. at 
155. The court reasoned that the state’s interest in boating safety outweighed individual 
liberty because there was no practical alternative to roving stops. Id. The court observed 
differences between automobile and boat travel, stating that checkpoint stops were an im-
practical alternative to roving stops because a “boat at sea can travel in any direction” and 
“is not limited by fixed roadways.” Id. Apart from reading Casal in light of Florida’s newly-
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Florida’s new boating enforcement provision adopts a hybrid ap-
proach that sets itself apart from the statutes enacted in Kentucky and 
Virginia.210 Once a law enforcement officer has performed a safety in-
spection on a boat, the boat displays a safety inspection decal alongside 
its registration decal.211 The statute requires law enforcement officers to 
have “reasonable suspicion that a violation of a safety equipment car-
riage or use requirement has occurred or is occurring” in order to stop a 
boat when a valid safety inspection decal is visible.212 
Although Florida’s new statute still authorizes suspicionless stops, 
it places limits on officer discretion after the boat has passed a safety 
inspection, thus preventing repeated, intrusive stops at the officers’ un-
bridled discretion.213 
In the ideal scenario, a state would adopt Ohio’s statute on the ac-
celerated timeline exemplified by Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida to 
hasten the protection of individual liberty. In Ohio, six years passed be-
tween Carr and the enactment of the Boater Freedom Act. In the mean-
time, law enforcement officers had unlimited discretion to stop boats 
without any suspicion of wrongdoing. By contrast, the Kentucky, Virgin-
ia, and Florida legislatures ensured the immediate protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights by amending their respective boating enforcement 
provisions without waiting for an appellate decision. Therefore, the ac-
celerated timeline model is preferable because it gets ahead of the prob-
lem. 
                                                                                                                                
enacted legislation, its holding is unreliable for two reasons. First, Casal pre-dated Villamon-
te-Marquez by one year. Because of this, the Casal court did not operate under the same 
precedent as post-Villamonte-Marquez decisions. Second, the stop at issue in Casal occurred 
on the Atlantic side of the Florida Keys, an area not only with “ready access to the open sea,” 
but literally in the open sea. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983); 
Casal, 410 So. 2d at 153. 
210. 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2016-134 (West). The statute provides in its en-
tirety: 
(2)(a) Upon demonstrated compliance with the safety equipment carriage and use re-
quirements of this chapter during a safety inspection initiated by a law enforcement officer, 
the operator of a vessel shall be issued a safety inspection decal signifying that the vessel is 
deemed to have met the safety equipment carriage and use requirements of this chapter at 
the time and location of such inspection. The safety inspection decal, if displayed, must be 
located within 6 inches of the inspected vessel's properly displayed vessel registration decal. 
For nonmotorized vessels that are not required to be registered, the safety inspection decal, if 
displayed, must be located above the waterline on the forward half of the port side of the 
vessel. 
(b) If a vessel properly displays a valid safety inspection decal created or approved by 
the division, a law enforcement officer may not stop the vessel for the sole purpose of inspect-
ing the vessel for compliance with the safety equipment carriage and use requirements of 
this chapter unless there is reasonable suspicion that a violation of a safety equipment car-
riage or use requirement has occurred or is occurring. This subsection does not restrict a law 
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The Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida statutes all achieve a 
favorable outcome: requiring law enforcement officers to have reasona-
ble suspicion of criminal activity before stopping a boat. However, Flori-
da’s new statute is less favorable because it authorizes law enforcement 
officers to conduct suspicionless stops where a boat lacks a safety in-
spection decal.214 The statute moves in the right direction, but does not 
go far enough because it still allows officers to conduct some stops in 
their unbridled discretion.215 The Kentucky and Virginia statutes move 
a step closer by making reasonable suspicion a prerequisite for all stops. 
Ohio’s statute is superior. By providing for checkpoint stops, it pro-
tects individual liberty and promotes governmental safety interests, 
thus achieving the best outcome for both individuals and the govern-
ment. Checkpoint stops favor individual liberty because they place sig-
nificant limits on officer discretion. At the same time, checkpoint stops 
favor governmental interests because they allow law enforcement offic-
ers to ensure boating safety by checking for personal floatation devices, 
fire extinguishers, and other required items. 
Ohio’s statute strikes a reasonable balance between competing in-
dividual and governmental interests; Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida 
represent the ideal timeline. If the Ohio Legislature had enacted its 
statute on an accelerated timeline, it would represent the perfect model. 
Idaho has the opportunity to become the perfect model. 
IV. IDAHO’S STANCE: A VAGUE STATUTE AND CHOPPY WATERS 
A. The Idaho Safe Boating Act and § 67-7028 
In 1986, the Idaho Legislature enacted the Idaho Safe Boating 
Act.216 In doing so, the Legislature intended “to improve boating safety, 
to foster the greater development, use and enjoyment of the waters of 
this state by watercraft.”217 The Act authorizes the Idaho Department of 
Parks and Recreation to “promulgate rules and regulations in compli-
ance with [the Act].”218 The enforcement provision of the Act is found in 
§ 67-7028.219 That provision provides that “[t]he sheriffs and deputy 
sheriffs of the respective counties shall be primarily responsible for the 
                                                       
214. 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2016-134 (West). 
215. Id. 
216. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-7001–7078 (2015). 
217. Id. § 67-7001. 
218. Id. § 67-7002. See generally IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 26.01.30 (2015). 
219. IDAHO CODE § 67-7028 (2015). 
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enforcement of this chapter and in the exercise of their authority may 
stop and board any vessel subject to law.”220  
Section 67-7028 is remarkably similar to the enforcement provi-
sions found in other states, like the one in Arkansas, which authorizes 
Fish and Game officers to “stop and board any vessel.”221 Like the Ar-
kansas statute, the scope of § 67-7028 is very broad: it authorizes offic-
ers to “stop and board any vessel subject to law,” but it does not specify 
whether officers must have some level of suspicion in order to do so.222 
An Idaho appellate court has never interpreted § 67-7028, nor ad-
dressed whether § 67-7028 requires law enforcement officers to have 
some level of suspicion before stopping a boat. Therefore, an appellate 
case interpreting § 67-7028 would be a case of first impression. The only 
Idaho appellate court decision addressing § 67-7028 is State v. Simpson, 
decided in 1987.223 However, the court in Simpson declined to interpret 
the statute.224 In Simpson, a sheriff’s deputy responded to an eyewitness 
complaint that a vessel was being operated improperly.225 When the 
deputy arrived, however, the vessel was already being pulled out of the 
water and loaded onto a trailer.226 As the van towing the trailer left the 
premises, the deputy followed and, after some distance, made a traffic 
stop.227 The deputy noticed that the man driving the van showed signs of 
intoxication and arrested him.228 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the stop was constitutional 
because the tip the deputy received prior to his arrival at the scene pro-
vided him with probable cause to believe that the man was engaged in 
illegal activity.229 Based on this conclusion, the court found that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether § 67-7028 authorized suspicionless 
boating stops on Idaho waterways.230 Although Simpson does not pro-
vide much guidance in the boating context, its reliance on automobile 
principles to reach its decision is prescient. Idaho case law addressing 
suspicionless automobile stops is very robust, and provides substantial 
guidance in the boating context. 
                                                       
220. Id. 
221. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105(a)(1)–(3) (2015). 
222. IDAHO CODE § 67-7028 (2015). 
223. State v. Simpson, 734 P.2d 669, 671, 112 Idaho 644, 646 (1987). 
224. Id. 




229. Simpson, 734 P.2d at 671, 112 Idaho at 646 (1987). 
230. Id. at 672, 647. 
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B. Idaho’s Line of Automobile Cases 
Parallels between automobiles and boats are particularly signifi-
cant on inland waterways. As Villamonte-Marquez explained, inland 
waterways lacking ready access to the open sea are more analogous to 
roadways.231 Much can be gleaned from Idaho appellate cases address-
ing automobile stops under the Fourth Amendment and the equivalent 
provision of the Idaho Constitution, Article I, § 17.232 These cases high-
light Idaho’s special interest in protecting individual liberty. 
In several instances, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that Arti-
cle I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides even greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment.233 This is “based on the uniqueness of [its] 
state, [its] Constitution, and [its] long-standing jurisprudence.”234 More 
specifically, in the context of checkpoint stops, Idaho appellate courts 
have sometimes diverged from U.S. Supreme Court precedent to provide 
Idaho drivers with increased protection.235  
For example, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a DUI checkpoint stop under the Fourth 
Amendment, finding that Michigan had a strong state interest in pre-
venting drunk driving.236 However, in State v. Henderson, the Idaho Su-
preme Court invalidated a DUI checkpoint stop under article I, § 17.237 
In Henderson, the Boise City Police Department established a roadblock 
in downtown Boise for the purpose of detecting drunk drivers.238 The 
police stopped every vehicle that passed through the checkpoint and di-
verted drivers who appeared to be intoxicated to a secondary evaluation 
point.239 The Idaho Supreme Court held that the roadblock was uncon-
stitutional under Article I, § 17, reasoning that the officers lacked indi-
                                                       
231. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983). 
232. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Section 17 provides that “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized.” Id. 
233. See, e.g., State v. Fees, 90 P.3d 306, 313–14, 140 Idaho 81, 88–89 (2004). 
234. Id. 
235. See, e.g., Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1063–64, 114 Idaho at 299–300 (1988) (“The 
Idaho Constitution can, where appropriate, grant more protection that its federal counter-
part.”). 
236. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
237. Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1063-64, 114 Idaho at 299–300 (1988). 
238. Id. at 1057. 
239. Id. at 1058. The officers gave each driver a pamphlet detailing the purpose of 
the roadblock. Id. This caused the motorists to open their windows so the officers could ob-
serve more closely. Id. 
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vidualized suspicion and legislative authority to establish a roadblock.240 
The Court stated: 
Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho 
is individual liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike 
the mountains, and float the rivers of this state without inter-
ference from the government. That is, police treat you as a crim-
inal only if your actions correspond.241 
Henderson illustrates that, perhaps more than anything else, Idaho val-
ues individual liberty. 
Just seven years after Henderson, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reached a similar result in State v. Medley.242 In Medley, the Idaho De-
partment of Fish and Game set up a highway check station on U.S. 
Highway 95 during hunting season.243 The Department also invited a 
myriad of other departments to participate at the checkpoint, including 
the Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office and the United States Border Pa-
trol.244 The checkpoint itself involved a brief stop of each vehicle in 
which a Department flagperson asked the drivers about their hunting 
and fishing activities.245 If a driver indicated that he had been fishing or 
hunting, or that he possessed any fish or game, the flagperson directed 
him to another officer for further inquiry.246 In addition to this, the flag-
person also directed vehicles to one of the other departments if he sus-
pected, for example, that the driver was under the influence of alcohol or 
had expired vehicle registration.247 
After weighing the corresponding individual and state interests, 
the Idaho Supreme Court once again invalidated the checkpoint.248 Alt-
hough the Court found that the State had a strong interest in the man-
agement and conservation of its natural resources, and that the level of 
intrusion to drivers was minimal, it stressed that the checkpoint was 
not “confined to the advancement of the State’s interest in the conserva-
tion of wildlife” because of the blanket invitation to multiple depart-
ments.249 The Court also found that, since there was no Department pol-
icy or criteria limiting the officers, they had “unfettered discretion.”250 
This was a problem, the Court found, since law enforcement officers 
                                                       
240. Id. at 1063. 
241. Id. at 1062. 
242. State v. Medley, 898 P.2d 1093, 1098, 127 Idaho 182, 187 (1995). 





248. Medley, 898 P.2d at 1098, 127 Idaho at 187 (1995). 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
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sometimes act unreasonably when provided with complete discretion.251 
In light of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement, the 
Court concluded, this sort of activity was unconstitutional.252 
Henderson and Medley illustrate Idaho’s special interest in protect-
ing individual liberty. Although the U.S. Supreme Court generally ap-
proves of checkpoint stops,253 Idaho appellate courts generally do not. 
Idaho courts, in fact, uphold such stops under very limited circumstanc-
es.254 For a stop to pass constitutional muster in Idaho, extensive limits 
must be placed on officer discretion.255 
For example, in State v. Thurman, an Idaho Fish and Game officer 
set up a checkpoint along a stretch of gravel road during hunting season 
in order to ask drivers about their hunting activities in the area.256 The 
officer asked each driver the same two questions: (1) whether the driver 
had been hunting that day and (2) whether the driver was transporting 
any fish or game.257 
The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the checkpoint stop was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Idaho statutes and 
regulations placed substantial limits on the officer’s discretion.258 Two 
Idaho statutes expressly authorized Fish and Game officers to conduct 
routine check stations.259 In addition to this, the Department of Fish and 
Game had adopted internal policy guidelines, which required officers to 
comply with a host of discretion-limiting requirements when conducting 
a checkpoint.260 These requirements included: prior checkpoint authori-
zation, one-hundred-yard visibility in both directions, signs displaying 
the word “stop” with sufficient visibility, and a flashing blue light on the 
side of the roadway.261 Since the officer complied with all of these re-
quirements, the court concluded that his discretion was sufficiently lim-
ited and upheld the constitutionality of the stop.262 
Read together, Henderson, Medley, and Thurman make one state-
ment eminently clear: Idaho’s policy choice favors individual liberty. 
                                                       
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (holding 
“that stops for brief questioning routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant”). 
254. State v. Thurman, 996 P.2d 309, 316, 134 Idaho 90, 97 (Ct. App. 1999). 
255. Id. at 313. 
256. Id. at 311–12. 
257. Id. at 312. 
258. Id. at 313-14, 316. 
259. Id. at 313. 
260. Thurman, 996 P.2d at 313, 134 Idaho at 94 (Ct. App. 1999). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
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While the U.S. Supreme Court and other states approve of automobile 
checkpoint stops liberally, Idaho does not follow this trend.263 Thurman 
illustrates this point.264 Idaho appellate courts uphold checkpoint stops 
under the narrowest of circumstances.265 In Thurman, it is difficult to 
imagine that the officer’s discretion could have been more limited. While 
automobile checkpoint stops are permitted in Idaho where officer discre-
tion is limited, roving, suspicionless automobile stops are clearly uncon-
stitutional.266 Similarities between automobiles and boats require Idaho 
courts to adhere closely to automobile precedent when evaluating suspi-
cionless boating stops, such as the one involving Mr. Newsom discussed 
in the introduction.267 
C. The Trial Court Level: State v. Newsom 
While there have been no appellate court decisions interpreting § 
67-7028 since the Idaho Legislature enacted the Idaho Safe Boating Act 
in 1986, there has been at least one trial court case: State v. Newsom.268 
As described in the introduction, the law enforcement officers who 
stopped Mr. Newsom’s boat on Lake Coeur d’Alene lacked reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. 269  Notwithstanding this fact, the trial 
court upheld the constitutionality of the stop under § 67-7028.270 
In reaching its decision, the court relied on four cases.271 First, the 
court relied heavily on Villamonte-Marquez to highlight differences be-
tween automobiles and boats.272 Second, the court relied on an Ohio case 
called State v. Deters273 to support its finding that “[i]n Ohio, state wa-
tercraft officers [were authorized to] constitutionally board, without a 
warrant, any vessel to conduct a routine safety inspection.”274 Third, the 
court relied on State v. Casal, discussed in Part III.C.2.b, to show that 
Florida authorized suspicionless stops because the stops were brief.275 
Finally, the court relied on Schenekl v. State, discussed in Part III.B.2, 
to show that Texas authorized suspcionless stops because there was no 
practical alternative.276 
                                                       
263. See, e.g., Medley, 898 P.2d at 1098, 127 Idaho at 187. 
264. See Thurman, 996 P.2d at 313–15, 134 Idaho at 94–96 
265. Id. 
266. See Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1062, 114 Idaho at 198 (1988). 
267. Newsom Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 2, at 1. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 10–11. 
270. Id. at 15–16. 
271. Id. at 11–15. 
272. Id. at 11–13. 
273. See generally State v. Deters, 714 N.E.2d 972 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
274. Newsom Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 2, at 13. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 13, 15. 
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Next, the court weighed Idaho’s interest in regulating public waters 
with individual liberty.277 The court concluded that Idaho’s “especially 
strong interest in promoting recreational water safety” outweighed indi-
vidual liberty because the stop at issue was brief.278  
Newsom is unhelpful for a number of reasons. First, it relied on in-
consistent precedent. The court suffered from an overbroad reading Vil-
lamonte-Marquez. Although the court recognized that the holding in Vil-
lamonte-Marquez was limited to waters “providing ready access to the 
sea,” the court failed to take the next step by distinguishing that hold-
ing. 279 Lake Coeur d’Alene—and every other body of water in Idaho, for 
that matter—lacks ready access to the open sea. The court’s reliance on 
Ohio boating law was also misplaced because, as discussed in Part 
III.C.2.a, state watercraft officers in Ohio may no longer stop and board 
Ohio boats without reasonable suspicion.280 Ohio has now codified that 
law enforcement officers are required to have reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity before stopping a boat.281 Likewise, the court’s reliance 
on Casal was misplaced. As noted in Part III.C.2.b, Casal is unreliable 
when dealing with recent boating stops because it pre-dated Villamonte-
Marquez and involved a stop on the Atlantic side of the Florida Keys, 
which is literally in the open sea.282 Moreover, Florida legislation enact-
ed in 2016 now requires law enforcement officers to have reasonable 
suspicion to stop a boat, unless the boat lacks a safety inspection de-
cal.283 Finally, the court’s reliance on Schenekl was misplaced. As noted 
in Part III.B.2, Schenekl suffered from an overbroad reading of Vil-
lamonte-Marquez and ignored the Supreme Court’s distinction between 
waters with ready access to the open sea and inland waters.284 
Second, Newsom is unhelpful because it failed to afford adequate 
weight to Idaho’s special interest in protecting individual liberty. No-
ticeably absent from the court’s opinion was an analysis of binding Ida-
ho precedent.285 In balancing state and individual interests, the court 
failed to discuss Idaho’s line of automobile cases, which demonstrate 
what Idaho appellate courts have articulated on multiple occasions: 
Idaho’s policy choice favors individual liberty.286 
                                                       
277. Id. at 15–16. 
278. Id. at 15. 
279. Id. at 11–13. 
280. See supra Part III.C.2.a. 
281. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1547.521(B) (West 2015). 
282. See supra Part III.B.1. 
283. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
284. See supra Part III.B.2. 
285. See generally Newsom Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 2. 
286. See, e.g., Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1062, 114 Idaho at 298. 
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Based on its reliance on inconsistent precedent and its failure to 
give adequate weight to Idaho’s special interest in protecting individual 
liberty, Newsom is unhelpful. Therefore, Idaho should look to states like 
Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida as models for its boating enforce-
ment framework. 
V. SMOOTHER SAILING: IDAHO SHOULD REQUIRE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
When states choose to allow suspicionless boating stops, that choice 
often reflects a very specific policy goal: to promote health and safety, 
for example, or to protect an area’s wildlife. While the Safe Boating Act 
does contain a broad policy goal of improving boating safety, Idaho has 
yet to make explicit how that goal relates to boating stops—at least 
through the normal and expected channels of judicial precedent or com-
prehensive legislation.287 But while Idaho case law in the boating stop 
arena is certainly scant, indicia of its policy goals in the area are not. 
Idaho police can treat citizens as criminals only if their actions corre-
spond.288 
Those words, from the Idaho Supreme Court’s own pen, are a 
strong statement of what Idaho values most in the constitutional con-
text: individual freedom. The State’s preference for personal liberty is 
clearest in the separate but similar automobile setting, where the Idaho 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to allow checkpoints that do not 
sufficiently limit officer discretion, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
unequivocal approval of those investigative tools.289 
Idaho’s willingness to favor individual liberty over other legitimate 
state policy goals—and to disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court to do 
so—is a bold choice. But the audacity is, at the moment at least, being 
wasted. The ambiguity in Idaho’s current Safe Boating Act leaves open 
the possibility that other courts, like the court in Newsom, will interpret 
its words to elevate safety over freedom. And although that would be a 
valid state purpose, it is not the one Idaho so confidently embraces in 
the analogous automobile context. 
From a constitutional perspective, the most significant problem 
with a suspicionless stop—in the automobile or boating context—is that 
law enforcement officers may exercise unbridled discretion. But, in its 
current state, the Idaho Safe Boating Act allows just that. There are 
presently no limitations placed on the discretion of Idaho law enforce-
ment officers when deciding whether to stop a particular boat.290 Section 
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67-7028 grants broad, ambiguous authority to “stop and board” boats.291 
Section 67-7002 authorizes the Department of Parks and Recreation to 
promulgate regulations.292 However, the Department has not promul-
gated any regulations designed to place limits on officer discretion when 
stopping boats.293 In its existing state, the Idaho Safe Boating Act suf-
fers from severe constitutional deficiencies. The time has come to act. 
Idaho and Ohio should share more than just similar-sounding 
names. Idaho should amend § 67-7028 to mirror Ohio’s boating enforce-
ment statute. If Idaho were to adopt Ohio’s statute, the new statute 
would support Idaho’s policy goal of elevating individual freedom over 
safety by placing substantial limits on officer discretion. But the new 
statute would not leave the government powerless. It would provide 
Idaho law enforcement officers with two primary paths to enforce boat-
ing safety laws. They could stop boats based on reasonable suspicion or 
at authorized checkpoints. 
The first section of the new Idaho statute would authorize a law en-
forcement officer to conduct stops based on reasonable suspicion.294 It 
would authorize an officer to stop a boat if 
the . . . law enforcement officer . . . has a reasonable suspicion 
that the vessel, the vessel’s equipment, or the vessel’s operator 
is in violation of this chapter or rules adopted under it or is oth-
erwise engaged in a violation of a law of this state or a local or-
dinance, resolution, rule, or regulation adopted in compliance 
with the provisions of this chapter within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the officer[.]295 
The second section would authorize a law enforcement officer to 
conduct an authorized checkpoint.296 It would authorize an officer to stop 
a boat if 
the . . . law enforcement officer . . . is conducting a vessel safety 
inspection in the course of an authorized checkpoint operation in 
accordance with rules adopted by the [Idaho Department of 
Parks and Recreation].297 
An important feature of the new statute is that it would authorize 
the Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation to promulgate discre-
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tion-limiting regulations. 298  Because of these regulations, checkpoint 
boating stops would be administered much like checkpoint automobile 
stops, and would therefore safeguard individual freedom. The two sec-
tions would also provide law enforcement officers with some discretion 
to determine which enforcement method to utilize, thus allowing them 
to effectively enforce boating safety laws, which would advance Idaho’s 
stated policy of improving boating safety. 
While Ohio’s statute provides the best language for Idaho’s new 
statute, Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida offer the better timeline. As 
discussed in Part III.C.2.b, Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida did not wait 
for an appellate court decision before amending their respective boating 
enforcement provisions.299 Idaho shouldn’t either. Idahoans deserve this 
kind of statutory protection as soon as possible. By enacting a statute 
like Ohio’s on an accelerated timeline, Idaho will best balance its strong 
interest in protecting individual freedom with its stated goal of boating 
safety. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This comment began with the image of Tom—face down and bound 
in the bottom of a boat. Tom represents the model, law-abiding citizen. 
Tom is not a criminal. Yet, under the current version of Idaho Code sec-
tion 67-7028, he was treated like one when his actions did not corre-
spond. Section 67-7028 is inconsistent with Idaho’s preference for indi-
vidual liberty. 
Under a new statutory framework requiring reasonable suspicion, 
it is clear that this would not have occurred. The law enforcement offic-
ers who stopped and boarded Tom’s boat lacked reasonable suspicion. 
Therefore, they never would have been able to board Tom’s boat in the 
first place, much less slam him face down in front of his family. 
In the constitutional context, as illustrated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in its line of automobile cases, Idaho values individual freedom 
above granting law enforcement officers unbridled discretion to ensure 
safety. If the Idaho Supreme Court has sanctioned officers to stop auto-
mobiles at checkpoints only under the narrowest of circumstances, why 
should officers be permitted to randomly stop boats at their complete 
discretion? 
Idaho’s special interest in protecting individual liberty requires 
more. Idaho should act to ensure the protection of individual freedoms 
by adopting Ohio’s boating enforcement statute, which requires law en-
forcement officers to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—or 
conduct an authorized checkpoint—when stopping a boat. This solution 
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adequately balances individual freedom and the stated policy goal of 
improving boating safety. And Idaho should do this on an accelerated 
timeline, thus ensuring the immediate implementation of these protec-
tions. 
In 1986, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized Idaho’s approach to 
interactions between law enforcement officers and individuals: “police 
[may] treat you as a criminal only if your actions correspond.”300 The 
Court has spoken clearly—now it is Idaho’s turn to act. 
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